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SPEAKERS
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF PANEL I: IS
THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DIE?
MICHAEL BRYCE*
I come to this Symposium as someone who is involved with le-
gal issues affecting the elderly. I work with the Elder Law Clinic
here at St. John's. The clinic represents low and moderate in-
come seniors in areas of vulnerability, including consumer fraud
cases, public benefit denials, and improper or illegal debt collec-
tion.
These issues clearly have a significant impact on senior citi-
zens. The issue which the panel will be discussing today, physi-
cian-assisted suicide, has the potential for greater impact not
only upon senior citizens but every one of us. After all, if you go
* J.D., Detroit Law School. Dean Bryce worked with the Union County Legal Services
concentrating on what is known as the field of elder law until 1980. He joined the New
Jersey State Public Advocates Office, working on the Mt. Laurel exclusionary zoning
cases. He then moved to the New York State Attorney General's Office where he handled
numerous air pollution and hazardous waste cases, including the Love Canal punitive
damages litigation.
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to a card store it is not suprising to see cards for people who are
eighty, cards for people who are ninety, and a significant number
of cards for people who have turned one-hundred. We are a soci-
ety that is living longer. 1 We have the benefit of ever increasing
advanced medical techniques that keep us alive longer.2
Most of us have known a relative, a friend or friend's relative
who is terminally ill and possibly in great pain, on a respirator
or in a coma. As we go through the two panel discussions today,
I would ask you to remember your thoughts about that person's
condition and their future. What were your thoughts concerning
issues about the sanctity of life? What were your thoughts about
that person choosing not to have continued medication, nutrition
or hydration? What were your thoughts about the person possi-
bly asking their doctor to help them end their life? Could you
imagine yourself in that person's position, dealing with those is-
sues?
This morning's discussion will, in part, address whether a
competent person, who is terminally ill, has a constitutional
right to determine the time and place of their death through
physician-assisted suicide. 3 The Supreme Court of the United
States faced this same question in the form of two cases, 4 one
from the Ninth Circuit and one from the Second Circuit.5 By July
1 See Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabili-
ties-Is it a Right Without a Freedom, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 52 (1993) (providing facts
of life-span increase due to science); see also Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-
Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A
Proposal for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1818, 1862 (1992)
(claiming that reasons elderly have hard choice is because of longer life-span).
2 See Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece to Be-
yond Cruzan Toward a Reasoned Legal Response to Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71
DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 181 (1993) (stating that vast increases in technology have led to
longer life); Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating 'The Last Syllable of...
Time" 53 U. PIT. L. REV. 153, 165-68 (1991) (same).
3 See Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die": On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L.
REV. 481, 481-99 (1996) (debating questions within this controversial subject); Robert A.
Sedler, Are Absolute Bans of Assisted Suicide Constitutional, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
725, 730 (1995) (deciding in favor of constitutional right); Kathleen McGowan, Note, Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide a Constitutional Right, 37 CATH. LAW. 225, 225-45 (1997)
(arguing that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide).
4 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2294 (1997) (presenting question as whether
New York's law against assisted suicide violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2259-60 (1997) (stating issue
as whether Washington law against "causing or aiding" terminally ill person's death con-
tradicts Fourteenth Amendment of Constitution).
5 See Quill v. Koppe, 80 F.3d 716, 718, 720-25 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that case was
first time issue had been addressed by that court); Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing this as first assisted suicide case at this
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we should know the Supreme Court's answer to this question. 6
In the first of these two cases, Compassion in Dying v. Wash-
ington,7 the Ninth Circuit held that any statute which prohibits
aiding another to commit suicide is contrary to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8
In deciding whether there was a constitutional right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit found that a liberty right
existed to determine the time and manner of one's death. 9 The
existence of such a liberty interest, however, did not mean that
the State of Washington could not regulate that liberty. 10 The
court balanced the competing interests of the State of Washing-
ton's power to regulate with the liberty of the terminally ill
plaintiffs' right to die.11 The court determined that while the
State of Washington had legitimate interests in protecting life,
preventing suicide, and in regulating doctors, those interests
were substantially reduced in the case of a terminally ill adult
who wished to end his life in the final stages of an incurable and
painful degenerative disease.
12
In making its ruling, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish be-
tween physician-assisted suicide and the decision to cut off
medical treatment.13 Apparently they found a liberty interest in
both cases.
The other case argued before the Supreme Court was Quill v.
Vacco. 14 Dr. Quill and two colleagues brought this action to
level of judiciary).
6 See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296 (holding that New York law did not violate Equal Pro-
tection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Compassion, 117 S. Ct. at 2259-60 (ruling
that Washington law did not violate Constitution).
7 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995).
8 See id. at 793 (finding that Washington statute, which prohibited physician-assisted
suicide by medication for competent terminally ill patents who want to hasten death,
violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
9 See id. at 816 (recognizing that individuals have due process liberty interest in has-
tening their deaths, which is at its peak when person is mentally competent terminally
ill adult who freely consents).
10 See id. (upholding state's right to regulate liberty interest to certain degree).
11 See id. at 816-37 (examining and balancing liberty interest against state's reasons
for regulating practice of assisted suicide).
12 See id. at 837 (reasoning that terminally ill individual's liberty interest outweigh
state's interest because it is most "painful, delicate, personal, important, and finar' deci-
sion of one's life).
13 See id. at 816 (citing Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
267-68 (1990)) (extending liberty interest of refusing medical treatment to that of assist-
ing one in hastening their own death).
14 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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challenge the constitutionality of New York statutes 15 that were
very similar to those in Washington. 16
The district court ruled against both a due process argument
and an equal protection argument. 17 The Second Circuit agreed
with the district court, finding there was no liberty interest, un-
like the Ninth Circuit had found.18 They also determined that
there was no fundamental right and no suspect classification in-
volved. 19
The court, however, did find that the New York statutes did
not meet the rational basis test, because they did not treat all
competent persons who were in the final stages of terminal ill-
ness equally. 20 The disparity is that the New York statutes pro-
hibited persons in the final stages of terminal illness from hav-
ing assistance in ending their lives, but those same statutes
allowed patients who were similarly situated to refuse medical
treatment. 2 1 The statutes were found to be violative of the Equal
Protection Clause for this reason. 22
I had the opportunity to watch both arguments before the Su-
preme Court. The questions that were put to the attorneys, by
the Justices, seemed to reflect strong doubt on the Court's part
about the existence of a liberty interest.2 3 It also appeared by
15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1994) (stating that person is guilty of
second degree manslaughter by intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide);
see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1994) (defining promoting suicide attempt
as crime in which one person intentionally aids another in committing suicide).
16 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 719. The plaintiffs alleged that portions of New York's Penal
Law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide violated the United States Constitution. Id.
17 See Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court ruled that since
there is no historic legal right to physician-assisted suicide, there cannot be a fundamen-
tal right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. On the equal
protection claim, the court found that the state had a rational basis for preserving the life
of vulnerable persons. Id.
18 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 722-25 (ruling that there is no liberty interest in assisted
suicide).
19 See id. at 724. The court, in declaring that there was no fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide, noted that there is no tradition deeply rooted in our culture
allowing such action. Id. Likewise, the court stated that the New York law does not dis-
criminate based on suspect classes of race, alienage, or national origin. Id. at. 726 (citing
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1980)).
20 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 (finding that classifications made by New York law had
no rational basis).
21 See id. at 729 (asserting that there is no difference between assisted suicide and
withdrawal of treatment from terminally ill).
22 See id. at 731 (finding statutes violative of Equal Protection Clause to extent that
it forbids physicians from prescribing medications to help mentally competent, termi-
nally ill persons hasten their deaths).
23 See Oral Argument, State of Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (U.S. Oral Arg.
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questions from Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy that the
Court doubted there was any violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.24
Interestingly enough Professor Tribe, arguing for Dr. Quill,
highlighted what appeared to be an appendage to the equal pro-
tection argument. 25 He stated that many terminal patients re-
ceive terminal sedation from doctors, resulting in their death.26
Terminal sedation is defined as the administration of a signifi-
cant level of the sedative, which results in a fairly quick death.
I have discovered that this concept actually was referred to in
an earlier point, because it is quoted in one of the amicus briefs
by one of our panehsts, 27 yet it had not been published in the
newspapers or discussed extensively until Professor Tribe iden-
tified this idea of terminal sedation.28
Earlier this year a state judge in Florida ruled that a termi-
nally ill patient had the constitutional right to terminate his suf-
fering and to determine the time and manner of his death. 29 The
state judge recognized, for the first time in any state court, a
constitutional right to die.30
These legal developments leave us today with questions: Is
there a constitutional liberty to physician-assisted suicide? Is
1997), available in 1997 WL 13671 (demonstrating that Justices spent most of their time
on liberty interest argument).
24 See Oral Argument, Quill v. Vacco, No. 95-1858 (U.S.Oral Arg. 1997), available in
1997 WL 13672 at *20. Here, Justice Kennedy commented that there was a long recog-
nized tradition against suicide. Id. Justice Souter's question recognized the difference
between withdrawing life support and giving medication to hasten someone's death. Id.
at *15.
25 See id. at *37. Professor Tribe described sedation as a process that combined the
withdrawal of life support and the prescription of drugs and stated that it occurs across
the country. Id.
26 See id. (describing terminal sedation as slow euthanasia).
27 See Amicus Curie Brief of Law Professors in Support of Respondents, State of
Washington v. Gluscksberg, Quill v. Vacco, (No. 95-1858, 96-110), available in 1996 WL
709330 at *9-10 (depicting terminal sedation as, "[p]atients who are not in persistent
vegetative state-who are conscious and competent but suffering from a terminal illness-
are offered the option of being sedated to complete unconsciousness and being allowed to
die of dehydration, starvation, or some intervening complication").
28 See The Court's Critical Decision, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 12, 1997, at Al (stating
that terminal sedation is equivalent of "winks and nods" to get around ban on assisted
suicide); Leonard John Deftos, Is There a Constitutional Right to Die?, SAN DIEGO UNION
& TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at B9, B11 (arguing that terminal sedation is what allows Dr.
Kevorkian to escape criminal liability); Frank J. Murray, A High Court Wrestles with As-
sisted Suicide. Many Views Aired on 'Choice' Issue, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at Al
(asserting that terminal sedation is widely practiced).
29 See McIver v. Kirscher, No. CL-96-1504-AF, 1997 WL 225878, at *9-12 (Fla. Cir.
Ct., Jan 31, 1997) (holding that there is recognized right to physician-assisted suicide).
30 Id. (stating that this is first state court to recognize this right).
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there a distinction between passive and active deaths for termi-
nally ill patients who are similarly situated? Should the courts
and, in particular, the Supreme Court, be addressing these is-
sues at this time, or should these issues be left to the state legis-
latures? If the Supreme Court does affirm either of the circuit
court decisions, could physician-assisted suicide be regulated
and, if so, how will it be regulated?
